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Abstract
In the standard economic theory, informed traders have more advantages in economic activities than
uninformed ones. In particular, it seems obvious that one can obtain more gains in ﬁnancial markets
by having more information about the fundamental values of an asset. This study examines whether
better-informed traders have an advantage over less-informed ones by conducting experimental
asset markets following Huber, et al. (2008, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization). Our
experiments show that better-informed traders do not necessarily gain more than less-informed
ones.
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1. Introduction
As often mentioned in the information economics, agents with more information have
an advantage in economic activities, although the advantage often promotes market failure
such as adverse selection and moral hazard. However, the recent literature on information
acquisition shows that informed traders do not necessarily outperform the uninformed
ones in ﬁnancial markets (cf. Sciubba, 2005). In this study, we consider a simpler setting
with no information acquisition costs in experimental asset markets, and examine whether
informed traders earn more proﬁts in asset trading than uninformed ones. Moreover, we
examine how asymmetric information impacts the decisions of subjects in experimental
asset markets.
Information in ﬁnancial markets means knowledge on the fundamental values of an
asset. The fundamental values of an asset comprise the value the asset truly creates. If
a trader has this information, she/he can compare it with the price and make a right
decision: if the price is higher than the fundamental value, she/he will sell the asset;
otherwise, she/he will buy it. This is theoretically derived from the standard literature of
rational expectations equilibrium since Grossman (1976). However, it is doubtful whether
the subjects in experiments make such rational decisions.
Several researchers have conducted experimental asset markets to examine such infor-
mation advantages in trading. Copeland and Friedman (1992) and Ackert et al. (2002)
showed that informed traders outperformed uninformed ones. However, their setting con-
sisted of two extreme types of subjects: those completely informed and those completely
uninformed. Schredelseker (1984, 2001) and Huber et al. (2008) modiﬁed the treatment of
information. They considered a case having more than two information levels. In addition,
the information was cumulatively given to traders; that is, a better-informed trader knows
everything that a less-informed trader knows. This depicts a situation such that better-
informed traders usually have both public and private information whereas less-informed
ones have only public information. This cumulative information system enabled them to
examine the marginal eﬀects of additional information.
Furthermore, Huber et al. (2008) compared the magnitude of information advantage
under diﬀerent mechanisms. They implemented two types of market mechanisms, a call
market and a double auction market. In addition, they distinguished two ways to determine
the fundamental values of an asset: (i) a binary process whereby the fundamental values
are determined in either 0s or 1s with probability 12 , and (ii) a Markov process whereby the
value of dividend changes within ±50% of the present dividend. Thus, they had four types
of experiments depending on two diﬀerent market mechanisms and two rules to determine
the fundamental values. However, they conducted only three experiments, leaving out the
call market with Markov process, perhaps due to some diﬃculties in conducting such an
experiment.
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The main diﬃculty is the diﬀerent settings between call markets and double auction
markets. In the setting of Huber et al. (2008), while subjects hold initial stocks at the
beginning in double auction markets, they do not do so in call markets. This is because
call markets determine the buyers and sellers based on their orders. We consider this
setting because Huber et al. (2008) tried to avoid the eﬀects of loss aversion, as did
Dupont and Lee (2002), who examined the prospect theory pioneered by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979). However, although Huber et al. (2008, p. 90) introduced fundamental
values following the Markov process to approximate real-world ﬁnancial markets, it is not
reasonable to set a call market with no initial stock or money. Therefore, we conduct the
case they did not investigate. In particular, we provide initial stocks to subjects at the
beginning of experiments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains our experimental
design. While our experiments basically follow Huber et al. (2008), we improve on the
diﬃculties as mentioned above. In Section 3, we show our results and compare them with
those of Huber et al. (2008). In Section 4, we give our conclusions and suggestions for
future works.
2. Experimental design
Following Huber et al. (2008), we conduct experiments in which a group of 10 subjects
trade in assets in call markets. Before an experiment, each subject is given 30 stocks as
initial holdings; an experiment consists of 30 trading periods.
Our experiments are computerized using Fischbacher’s (2007) z-tree, and the subjects
trade by placing their bids through the individual computer screen, in front of which each
of them sits. Subjects can take 40 seconds to decide their orders and another 20 seconds
to check the results in each period. In bidding, each subject submits the price that she is
willing to pay each period. The computer gathers the bidding prices and then decides the
market price based on the median of bids in each period. That is, the market price of a
group is determined by the average of the 5th and 6th bids. For example, if the bidding
prices at a certain period are {0, 3, 4, 4, 5, 6, 7, 7, 7, 8}, the market price is 5.5, that is,
the average of the 5th and 6th bids.
All traders who bid lower than the market price become sellers, and all the others
become buyers. The bidding price is used only to determine whether a subject is a seller
or buyer. In our call market, traders cannot choose to be either a seller or buyer of an
asset; the role of seller or buyer is decided on the prices they turn in and the market price.
If the market price is the same that a subject turned in, the subject is neither a seller nor
a buyer.
The traders’ payoﬀ is decided based on the market price and fundamental values. There-
fore, we ﬁrst explain the fundamental values for each period before explaining how to
decide the payoﬀs. When a subject holds an asset, she obtains dividends each period. In
our experiment, the dividend is assumed to be determined following the Markov process,
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where dividends change within ±50% every period. That is, the next-period dividend is
randomly chosen in the ±50% change of the previous dividend.
We prepare two diﬀerent schedules1 of dividends, as shown in Table 1. In the table,
Game 1 is the schedule used in the ﬁrst game and Game 2 that used in the second game.The
average of the dividends in both the games is set identically.
Once the schedule of the dividends is given, the fundamental value FVt per asset at the
beginning of period t is calculated as FVt =
∑30
r=t dr, where dt is the dividend at period t.
That is, the fundamental value at period t is the total value of dividends between period
t and the last period. Those in Games 1 and 2 are also shown in Table 1. At the end of
each period, subjects can observe the trading results, present dividend, future dividends,
and fundamental values of the next period on the screen.
　
Given the market price and fundamental value at period t, the traders’ role as either
seller or buyer is decided as mentioned above. If the market price at period t is Pt, with
FVt the fundamental value, the payoﬀs of the buyers and seller are decided as follows:
Buyers’ payoﬀ: FVt − Pt; Seller’s payoﬀ: Pt − FVt.
The above payoﬀs imply that the same role, as either buyer or seller, obtains the same
payoﬀ. The payoﬀ structure reﬂects the actual gains of the traders. Indeed, fundamental
value literally means the value that an asset creates. While buyers enjoy the value minus
the dealing cost Pt, sellers enjoy the proﬁt.
Finally, we explain the information asymmetry the traders face. Traders in the ex-
periments are explained all the setting we explain above. Then, they know that each of
them has diﬀerent information of fundamental values. Furthermore, as mentioned before,
traders can see the trading results, their present dividend, their future dividends, and the
fundamental values of the next period on the screen each period.
Information asymmetry is reﬂected in how to show the future dividends as follows:
Recall that a group consists of 10 subjects. We set 10 types of information for the 10
subjects as follows: Each subject is indexed from 1 to 10.2 We give subject i ∈ {1, . . . , 10}
the dividend information for her future i-period. That is, if the subject’s index is 3, she
obtains the information of dividends for three subsequent periods. In the next section, we
show how the diﬀerent information levels impact trade and proﬁts.
3. Results
Our experiments were conducted on December 24, 2013, at the University of Tsukuba
with a total of 70 subjects (23 subjects from our department oﬀering economics classes, and
47 from other departments), divided into 7 groups of 10 subjects. Our experiments lasted
90 minutes, in addition to 30 minutes spent for instruction using Microsoft powerpoint
1Game 1 gives the same schedule as in Huber et al. (2008). In their schedule, the change of dividends
is within ±30%. Then, in Game 2, the change is randomly made within ±30%.
2These are hypothetical indices, and the subjects do not know them.
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Table 1. Schedules of dividend and fundamental value (F.V.)
Game 1 Game 2
Period t Dividend dt FVt Dividend dt FVt
1 20 620 19 620
2 19 600 20 601
3 22 581 18 581
4 21 559 20 563
5 19 538 22 543
6 20 519 23 521
7 21 499 20 498
8 20 478 21 478
9 23 458 28 457
10 25 435 21 429
11 28 410 23 408
12 27 382 25 385
13 25 355 20 360
14 26 330 20 340
15 25 304 21 320
16 22 279 23 299
17 18 257 19 276
18 17 239 17 257
19 14 222 19 240
20 15 208 18 221
21 13 193 22 203
22 17 180 15 181
23 20 163 18 166
24 22 143 20 148
25 26 121 19 128
26 18 95 18 109
27 17 77 20 91
28 20 60 22 71
29 21 40 23 49
30 19 19 26 26
Ave. 20.7 n/a 20.7 n/a
slides. After the instructions, we set three quizzes3 for the comprehension of participants,
and we took 60 minutes for two games (40 seconds for trading and 20 seconds for checking
3See Appendix A1.
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Figure 1. Deviations from fundamental values in Game 1
the results in each period) and 30 minutes for ﬁlling in the questionnaire4 and payments.
The subjects’ average earning was 2,753 yen, including 750 yen as participation fee. We
used “points” as a money unit in our experiments, and 10 points were exchanged for 1
yen at the payment stage.
3.1. Bubbles under asymmetric information. We ﬁrst consider the transitions be-
tween market prices and fundamental values depicted in Figures 1 and 2. To show the
deviation from fundamental value FVt at period t, both the graphs depict the diﬀerence
between the market price Pt and FVt across the seven groups, where the x-axis represents
periods and the y-axis the points of Pt − FVt.
A deviation from fundamental values is often called a bubble5. To compare the degree
of bubbles across the groups and games, we use two indicators, RAD and RD , introduced
Figure 2. Deviations from fundamental values in Game 2
4See Appendix A2.
5There seems to be no consensus on when bubbles occur and how large a deviation can be.
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Table 2. RAD and RD in Games 1 and 2
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 Average
RAD Game 1 0.100 0.190 0.082 0.317 0.147 0.033 0.097 0.138
Game 2 0.051 0.134 0.036 0.151 0.044 0.027 0.049 0.070
RD Game 1 0.065 0.156 0.047 0.200 0.143 -0.006 0.072 0.097
Game 2 0.011 0.120 0.017 0.120 0.043 0.022 0.041 0.054
by Stockl et al. (2010) as follows:
RAD = 1
N
∑N
t=1 |Pt − FVt|
F¯ V
;
RD = 1
N
∑N
t=1(Pt − FVt)
F¯ V
,
where N is the number of periods, pt the market price at period t, FVt the fundamental
value at period t, and F¯ V the average of fundamental values across the periods. RAD gives
the degree of diﬀerence between the fundamental value and market price on average, and
RD gives the degree of diﬀerence without an absolute sign. Thus, RD additionally shows
whether their diﬀerence is positive or negative. If there are both positive and negative
deviations from the fundamental values, the deviations cancel out each other. Thus, it is
obvious that RD is always less than or equal to RAD.
The RAD and RD in Games 1 and 2 are summarized in Table 2. Let us now consider the
RAD in Game 1. The values are .138 and .070 on average in Games 1 and 2, respectively,
meaning that the deviations are 13.8 % and 7.0% per period on average in Games 1 and 2,
respectively. Since the RAD in Game 1 is larger than that in Game 2, a larger deviation
occurs in Game 1. Since RAD is calculated from the absolute value of deviations between
the market price and fundamental values, it cannot identify whether a deviation is positive
or negative. To examine this, we need to use RD as well.
As the RDs in both games are positive, a deviation from the fundamental values is
positive on average. They are 9.7% and 5.4% over the fundamental values on average in
Games 1 and 2, respectively. Similarly, the RD in Game 1 is larger than that in Game 2.
This means that totally the deviation is larger in Game 1 than in Game 2.
Furthermore, we calculate the diﬀerence between the market price (Pt) and the next
fundamental value FVt+1 at period t, that is, (Pt − FVt+1), and compare it with the
dividend at period t for each group as shown in Figures 3 and Fig. 4. In both graphs,
the x-axis represents the periods and y-axis the points. These ﬁgures show how much the
traders earn or lose each period in trading. If the traders are rational, they would bid at a
price equivalent to the present fundamental value each period, and would make a proﬁt of
the dividend, represented by the black line. Indeed, this is possible because all the traders
can observe both the next fundamental value and dividend each period on the computer
screen of the last trade even though they may have diﬀerent information levels.
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However, as Figures 3 and 4 show, almost all the market prices do not coincide with
the dividend in both games. When (Pt−FVt+1) is greater than the dividend, sellers earn
by the amount of the diﬀerence, (Pt−FVt+1)−dt(= Pt−FVt). This is because the sellers
who sell an asset gain only dt at the higher price.
3.2. Traders’ returns and Information levels. We next show the subjects’ average
returns at each information level. These results for Games 1 and 2 are depicted in Figures
5 and 6, respectively. In these ﬁgures, the x-axis represents the information levels of
subjects, where 1 indicates the least informed and 10 the most informed. The y-axis
represents the payoﬀs the subjects obtained. Therefore, each dot in these ﬁgures shows
how many points each subject of an information level obtained. The lines in the ﬁgures
represent the average payoﬀs in each information level.
We now examine the results of these two ﬁgures. In Figure 5, the subjects who obtain
the highest payoﬀ are not on the 10th information level, but on the 7th information level
on average. In particular, subjects on the 8th and 9th levels obtain payoﬀs as high as
that of those on the lower information levels. This tendency is also observed in Figure 6.
Indeed, the payoﬀs on information levels 3, 4, and 5 dominate those on level 6 and above
information level. Therefore, we conclude that more information does not necessarily give
the traders more payoﬀs. This result is the same6 as in Huber et al. (2008).
3.3. Understanding games. We showed that better-informed traders do not necessarily
outperform the less-informed ones. Indeed, less-informed traders gain more proﬁts in some
Figure 3. Relationship between traders’ proﬁts in Game 1
6In fact, we tried to conduct a statistical test by gathering more data. Unfortunately, the additional
experiments we conducted failed and we could not obtain additional data. To overcome this failure, we
tried to merge the data of Games 1 and 2. We made the following null hypothesis for a statistical test: the
distributions of every information level are same. However, the Friedman test did not reject the hypothesis
on the 5% level (p = .087). We therefore gave up merging the data. As a result, we could not conduct
more statistical tests.
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Figure 4. Relationship between traders’ proﬁts in Game 2
cases. What kind of subjects earns more proﬁts in our experiments? We examine this
question from the viewpoint of the understanding level of subjects. To classify their
understanding level, we asked them to ﬁll in the questionnaire shown in Appendix A2
after completing each game; we obtained 70 valid responses.
For example, in Q8, we asked the subjects how they understood the way to trade from
this experiment. The alternative answers are as follows: (1) not at all, (2) a little bit,
(3) neither, (4) almost all, (5) completely. The answers are summarized in Table 3. We
consider their answers as their level of understanding the trading rules and classify the
alternatives by the corresponding numbers from 1 to 5, where 1 is the least and 5 the
most.
In another questionnaire on free-writing style, the subjects are asked how they bid
in trading. Those with an understanding level of 1 or 2 seemed to trade with less un-
derstanding, because their answers were like “groping in the dark.” Those with good
Figure 5. Subjects’ payoﬀs based on information levels in Game 1
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Figure 6. Subjects’ payoﬀs based on information levels in Game 2
Table 3. Understanding of subjects in Games 1 and 2
Understanding levels 1 2 3 4 5 Total Average
Numbers in Game 1 7 35 13 11 4 70 2.57
Distribution 10% 50% 19% 16% 6% 100%
Numbers in Game 2 4 28 13 21 4 70 2.9
Distribution 6% 40% 19% 30% 6% 100%
understanding, that is, those with an understanding level of 4 or 5, seemed to trade by in-
ferring the (hidden) fundamental values. Thus, they could avoid the mismatch of demand
and supply, and tried to buy more stocks.
Next, we examine whether subjects’ understanding levels are related to their proﬁts.
The relationship is depicted in Figures 7 and 8. In the ﬁgures, the x-axis represents the
understanding levels from 1 to 5, and the y-axis the payoﬀ points. Each dot represents
Figure 7. Relationship between payoﬀs and understanding levels in Game 1
10
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Figure 8. Relationship between payoﬀs and understanding levels in Game 2
a subject’s proﬁt with the corresponding understanding level. The red line shows the
average proﬁt for each understanding level. These graphs show that the average proﬁt
rises in Game 1 when the understanding level rises; however, in Game 2, the understanding
level does not aﬀect their proﬁts. This could be because the subjects understood the rules
of our experiments and the variance between the understanding levels became smaller.
Thus, those with better understanding levels did not have an advantage.
4. Conclusion and future research
In this study, we examined how subjects with more information can expect larger returns
in ﬁnancial markets. We conducted experimental asset markets in this study following
Huber et al. (2008). Huber et al. (2008) found that subjects gain more returns only if
they are well informed. On the other hand, indecisive information does not contribute to
returns, but rather makes them worse oﬀ.
Following Huber et al. (2008), we conducted call market experiments with two types
of Markov dividend processes and compared the results. One dividend schedule is the
same as in Huber et al. (2008), and the other is the same as in our experiment. In both
schedules, more information did not increase subjects’ returns.
Then, we examined subjects’ understanding levels in our experiments. Indeed, some
studies such as Huber and Kirchler (2012) and Kirchler et al. (2012) show that subjects’
understanding levels play a central role in such experiments. However, we found only one
game (Game 1) in our experiment showed that better understanding could lead to more
payoﬀs.
In these experiments, we could not conduct a statistical test because we failed to gather
enough data. We need to have more statistical experiments to examine how several fac-
tors relate to each other. In particular, we need to investigate the eﬀects of asymmetric
11
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information. In fact, the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis was caused by asymmetric informa-
tion. As mentioned in the information economics literature, such information structures
could lead to market failure and economic agents may have incentives of moral hazard.
In comparison with theoretical studies, there are very few experimental investigations. In
future studies, we intend to conduct more experiments with asymmetric information to
arrive at clearer conclusions.
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Appendices
A1: Comprehensive quizzes. We asked the subjects to answer these three quizzes for
estimating their comprehension of the rules. We neither checked their answers before the
experiment, nor revealed the rewards for the experiments.
Quizzes:
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(1) When the subjects bet the following prices, calculate the market price: 0-20-30-
40-40-50-50-60-70-70.
(2) When the market price is 45, which is the role of the following subjects: buyer,
seller, or neutral?
a: The subject who bid at 0;
b: the subject who bid at 45;
c: the subject who bid at 70.
(3) When the market price is 45 and the fundamental value is 30, what is the payoﬀs
of the following subjects, buyer, seller, and neutral?
a: The subject who bid at 0;
b: the subject who bid at 45;
c: the subject who bid at 70.
A2: Questionnaire. We prepare a common questionnaire for games 1 and 2. In the
Questionnaire session, the subjects were asked the following questions:
Q1: How many information did you get among 10 levels?
Q2: How long did you check the information on dividends?
[never, sometimes, half the time, often, always]
Q3: Did you believe the fundamental values?
[not at all, a little bit, middle, almost entirely, always]
Q4: What is your rank of earning in your group?
[Worst, second worst, exactly in the middle, second best, best]
Q5: Imagine other subjects who have the same information level. Then, is your
earning higher than, lower than, or identical to theirs?
Q6: How was the market?
[low price, average, high price]
Q7: How did you order?
[try to buy, neither, try to sell]
Q8: Did you understand the way to trade in this experiment?
[not at all, a little bit, half, almost completely, completely]
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